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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we evaluate the influence of two environmental policy levers on emissions
in the metal-finishing industry: a voluntary program—the Strategic Goals Program
(SGP)—and the threat of formal regulation. While voluntary approaches are increasingly
utilized as policy tools, the effectiveness of such programs is often questioned, and the
impact of a voluntary program in tandem with a regulatory threat is not well
understood. We examine the decision to participate in the SGP and, conditional on that
decision, determine the effects that the SGP and regulatory threat had on facility
emissions behavior. Participation in the program appears related to several forms of
external pressure: the regulatory threat, industry trade association membership, the
level of environmental giving in a state, and a number of neighborhood characteristics.
However, over the entire study period, participation in the SGP yielded little, if any,
additional reductions in emissions, while the regulatory threat is correlated with
significant emission reductions by both participants and non-participants. Splitting our
study period into two time periods reveals a more nuanced relationship between SGP
participation and emissions behavior than is evident over the entire study period. While
participants do not appear to take advantage of the program initially, they make greater
strides in reducing emissions than non-participants in later years. The split sample
results also indicate that both participants and non-participants react strongly to the
initial threat of regulation and to an increase in its relative stringency.
& 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, regulators seek to provide adequate environmental protection at the lowest cost. This has led to the use of
more flexible market-based and voluntary approaches to augment command-and-control regulatory approaches.
Voluntary approaches, ranging from voluntary programs, environmental management systems, and labeling, have become
increasingly popular as a way to enhance the efficacy and scope of existing regulations and to reduce emissions in sectors
or for pollutants where formal environmental regulation is lacking. In this paper, we examine the influence of two
environmental policy levers on emissions in the metal-finishing industry: a voluntary program—the Strategic Goals
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Program (SGP)—and the threat of more formal regulation. We examine the decision to participate in the SGP and,
conditional on that decision, determine the effects of the SGP and regulatory threat on facility emissions behavior. We also
examine whether the effects of these policy levers on emissions behavior varies over time.
Since the introduction of EPA’s first voluntary program in 1991, voluntary approaches have increasingly been used to
address environmental issues in the US [5]. The literature posits a variety of reasons why firms may voluntarily participate
in programs designed to reduce emissions beyond levels required by regulation. Voluntary measures may allow firms to
reduce costs1 [4] or improve their environmental reputationwith ‘‘green’’ consumers and investors [2,3,24]. A more cynical
view argues that firms may engage in voluntary activities to provide a smokescreen for poor environmental performance
[18]. It has also been argued that firms may act strategically, using the voluntary program to signal environmental
responsibility to regulators in order to reduce the likelihood of future regulation [9,29,32,35]. How strongly this signal is
conveyed may depend on the immediacy and severity of the threat. From the EPA’s perspective, voluntary approaches are
attractive if they lead to greater innovation [39] or achieve environmental objectives ‘‘more quickly and with lower costs’’
than regulatory approaches [37].
While there has been vigorous debate as to why voluntary approaches are used and their potential advantages over
traditional policy tools, evidence of effectiveness has been mainly limited to EPA’s large, multi-sector and climate-related
voluntary programs. There is evidence that programs such as 33/50 and Green Lights were successful in reducing
participant emissions [21,23]. However, studies find that EPA overstated progress toward environmental goals by failing to
account for non-program factors, non-participant actions, and the ability to count prior reductions toward program goals
[8,13,14,23]. Studies of other voluntary programs find less evidence of a discernible effect [25,33,40]. Welch et al. [40]
report that the Climate Challenge Program did not result in participants improving environmental performance relative to
others. In fact, there is evidence that participants performed worse than non-participants. Morgenstern et al. [33] find a
temporary reduction in participants’ fuel use as a result of Climate Wise, but this effect did not last past the initial years of
the program.
Regulatory threats may also encourage improved environmental performance. Such changes in environmental
performance may allow firms to better prepare themselves in the event that stricter regulations are imposed in the future.
Moreover, improved environmental performance of the industry as a whole may decrease the likelihood and relative
stringency of future regulation. To our knowledge, few papers empirically examine the role such a threat may play. When
the threat is weak, abatement levels are likely to be lower than levels under regulation. When the threat of regulation is
strong, cost savings and increases in social welfare are closer to levels achieved under optimal regulatory action [34,35].
Maxwell et al. [32] model a strategic game in which firms voluntarily reduce emissions in an attempt to preempt future
regulation. Empirically, they find support for their hypothesis: firms voluntarily reduce toxic releases more rapidly in states
with larger conservation membership, where the potential threat of regulation is higher. Henriques and Sadorsky [20]
examine firms’ environmental responsiveness more generally and find that regulatory pressure—both actual and
anticipated—matters. Anton et al. [1] find that regulatory pressures do not directly impact emissions but do influence the
type of environmental management systems adopted by firms.
In this paper, we examine emissions reductions in the metal-finishing industry at a time when the industry faced a
credible regulatory threat but also had the opportunity to participate in a voluntary program, the SGP. Several
characteristics of these policies make the metal-finishing industry an interesting case study. Firstly, unlike broad-based
voluntary programs evaluated in the past, the SGP is a sector-based program that provides information and establishes
goals that are tailored to a specific industry [10]. As a sector-based program, these goals were established through
negotiation among multiple stakeholders, unlike many voluntary programs studied thus far. Secondly, the metal-finishing
sector differs from many of the sectors that typically participate in voluntary programs (e.g., the chemical industry) in that
it is characterized by small, single-facility firms, many of which are privately held. Thirdly, the nature of the regulatory
threat changes over time, allowing us to compare the effect of the initial threat with one of relatively greater stringency. We
first ask if the regulatory threat and other factors played a role in the decision to participate in the SGP. We then attempt to
determine what effect, if any, the voluntary program and regulatory threat had on the pollution profile of facilities.2 Finally,
we split the sample into two time periods to examine whether the SGP had initial success in encouraging greater emission
reductions from participants, whether this difference in emissions eroded over time, and whether a change in the nature of
the regulatory threat over the study period affected emissions behavior.
2. Metal finishing: the Strategic Goals Program and threat of regulation
The origin of the EPA’s SGP can be traced to the Common Sense Initiative (CSI). Launched in 1994, the CSI was a
consensus-based, multi-stakeholder initiative designed to identify ‘‘cleaner, cheaper, and smarter’’ sector-based approaches
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1 Lower costs may arise directly from a voluntary program or measure (e.g., the use of energy-efficient lighting in Green Lights) or indirectly (e.g.,
reducing a firm’s environmental risk may lower insurance premiums). Environmentally friendly firms may also find it easier to raise capital if
environmental performance results in higher stock market valuations [17,27].
2 We examine the impact of the SGP on the total pounds of a facility’s emissions. In the appendix of the paper, available through JEEM’s online archive
of supplementary material at http://www.aere.org/journal/index.html, we examine the impact of the SGP on toxicity-weighted emissions. Our key
findings are robust to this alternate specification.
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to protect human health and the environment in six industries, one of which was metal finishing [11]. Rather than rely on
strict guidelines and command-and-control regulations for specific media (e.g., air, water), the premise of the initiative was
that firms would find cheaper, more innovative ways to reduce environmental impacts if they were given flexibility to
address pollution control.
This appeal was further enhanced when the metal-finishing industry came under threat of regulation. First introduced
in 1995, the Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Metal Products and Machinery
Point Source Category (or the MP&M regulation) sought to impose new effluent guidelines and pretreatment standards for
wastewater discharges from metal products and machinery facilities. The MP&M regulation was re-proposed in 2001 to
apply to a wider range of sectors and with more stringent limits than in 1995. It was made final in 2003, though the metal-
finishing industry was exempted from the final regulation.3 However, over our study period the threat of regulation to the
metal-finishing industry was quite real.4
With the MP&M regulatory threat in the background, the CSI began developing the SGP in 1996. Much of the
stakeholder negotiation on the nature of the program was completed that year. The regulatory threat is mentioned as one
reason why stakeholders succeeded in reaching consensus [22]. The SGP was launched by the EPA along with several
industry trade organizations at the end of 1997.5 Within a year, the program had over 250 participants. By the program’s
end in 2002, 550 facilities had joined the SGP, with most new participants joining in 2000 or after.
The SGP provided an industry-specific way in which the more general objective of the CSI could be met. It encouraged
companies ‘‘to go beyond environmental compliance’’ through the achievement of seven specific goals: 50% reduction in
water usage, 25% reduction in energy use, 90% reduction in organic TRI releases, 50% reduction in metals released to water
and air (as reported to TRI), 50% reduction in land disposal of hazardous sludge, 98% metals utilization, and reduction in
human exposure to toxic materials in the facility and surrounding community [36]. Facilities that joined the SGP committed
to accomplishing these goals by 2002. The achievement of these goals was measured against a 1992 baseline. When facilities
joined the SGP, they were asked to estimate baseline emissions, using 1992 or an alternate year if these datawere unavailable.
To encourage facilities to join and to help them meet program goals, the SGP established the National Metal Finishing
Resource Center (NMFRC) to act as a clearinghouse for technical information and a place where participants could seek
assistance in improving environmental performance. The NMFRC collected annual surveys to track environmental
performance of SGP members, determined if facilities had met program goals, and provided online access to a feature
comparing a member’s performance to that of other participants.6 By identifying areas where facilities scored poorly, the
hope was that they would learn where to focus efforts to improve in the future. The SGP also offered free, non-regulatory
environmental audits, on-site technical assistance, funding for environmental technologies, free workshops on energy,
water and waste reduction, environmental management system (EMS) training, and free interns to help facilities fill out
paperwork associated with the program. While some technical and regulatory information was publicly available from
NMFRC, access to a detailed technical database, performance evaluations and free, hands-on assistance were made
available only to participants.
The metal-finishing industry is a good candidate for assessing the effect of two environmental policy levers: a voluntary
program (the SGP) and a credible regulatory threat (MP&M regulation). The regulatory threat was real and immediate; the
SGP set explicit targets; annual reporting and environmental performance comparisons allowed participants to monitor
progress relative to a baseline and to identify areas for improvement; and an independent, third-party organization
(NMFRC) provided technical assistance and information to SGP members. We seek to explore three questions with regard
to these policy levers: What factors affected a facility’s decision to participate in the voluntary SGP? What factors affected
facility TRI air emissions, and did the SGP and MP&M regulatory threat play a role in affecting those emissions? Did the
effects of the SGP and the MP&M regulatory threat on emissions change over time?
3. Empirical model
To the extent that firms derive net benefits from a voluntary program, they will join. The extent to which this translates
into real behavioral change (i.e., reductions in emissions) must also be directly associated with the derivation of positive
net benefits, since firms will incur additional costs to make these changes. We present a modeling framework in this
section to examine factors associated with the decision to join and with emissions changes.
We first model the facility’s net benefit from participation Dnit in the voluntary program
Dnit ¼ b1X1it þ 1it , (1)
where X1it is a vector of exogenous variables for the ith firm at time t, b1 is a vector of parameters, and e1it is a random error
term. Since the net benefits of participating, Dnit , are not observed, we proxy for this with the observed participation
ARTICLE IN PRESS
3 In February 2003, EPA announced that it would exempt the metal-finishing industry from the final MP&M regulation due to economic infeasibility;
analysis showed that half of the metal-finishing job shops would close due to the regulation.
4 The 2001 proposed rule argued that excluding the industry was not appropriate.
5 They are the National Association of Metal Finishers (NAMF), American Electroplaters and Surface Finishers Society (AESF), Metal Finishing
Suppliers Association (MFSA), and Surface Finishing Industry Council (SFIC).
6 These data are not shared with the US EPA in a way that allows for facility identification.
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decision of the facility, Dit:
Dit ¼ 1 if Dit40;
Dit ¼ 0 otherwise:
(2)
This allows us to estimate
Dit ¼ Fðb1X1itÞ þ mit . (3)
If F(  ) is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal variate e1it, then Eq. (3) can be estimated using the probit
model.
Next, we characterize the pollution level of facility i at time t as
Yit ¼ aDit þ b2X2it þ 2it , (4)
where Yit is the pollution level, Dit is SGP participation, X2it is an exogenous facility-specific variable vector, a is a parameter,
b2 is a vector of parameters, and e2it is a random error term.
To examine whether the SGP affected facility emission behavior, we examine how pollution levels change over the time
period for which the SGP was in place:
DYit ¼ aDDit þ b2DX2it þD2it , (5)
where D is the change in the variable between time period t and t1. We examine the change in facility emissions over the
entirety of the SGP to determine the long term impact of the program as well as factors such as the regulatory threat.
We also divide the sample in half to examine how the effects of different factors on emissions might have changed over
time.
Estimation of Eq. (5) may lead to biased estimates if the participation variable, Dit, is not exogenous. Facilities that
receive the most benefits from the SGP—be that cover from regulatory threat or increased flexibility to reduce
emissions—may also be most likely to join the SGP. We test for bias and use an instrumental variable approach instead of
letting participation directly enter Eq. (5). To implement the instrument approach, we first separately estimate the
participation decision in Eq. (3) using a probabilistic choice model to obtain consistent estimates of b^1. We then estimate
the predicted probability of participation, D^it ¼ Fðb^1X1itÞ. Finally, we use the predicted probability of participation as an
instrument in Eq. (5). Through this estimation procedure, the final estimates of a and b2 are consistent [19,23,40].
4. Data
To evaluate the SGP and MP&M regulatory threat, we create a unique dataset from a variety of sources, including EPA’s
Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI), Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO), Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act Information database (RCRIS), and Green Book. We limit our study to facilities reporting emissions to TRI in the metal-
finishing industry (SIC 3471) in the continental United States.7 Since three of the SGP’s seven goals relate to TRI emissions
(90% reduction in organic TRI releases, 50% reduction in metals released to water and air, and reduction in human exposure
to toxic materials in the facility and surrounding community), these data should provide a useful measure of the relative
progress of members and non-members. To these data, we add information on participation in the SGP, a trade group, and
other voluntary agreements; state-level dues and contributions to environmental organizations; a state-level regulatory
stringency index [28]; neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics; and facility-specific information from InfoUSA. We
drop facilities that were late joiners of the SGP in 2000 or 2001, since there may have been insufficient time to achieve
significant emission changes before the program ended in 2002. In total we have 199 facilities in our data set, 65 of which
are SGP members.8 Our sample of SGP participants represents approximately 25% of the total SGP population that signed
up to participate prior to 2000.
4.1. Variables
We estimate two main types of regression equations, one that examines what factors affect facility participation in the
SGP and one that examines what factors affect facility emissions behavior. The dependent variable for the participation
equation is defined as SGP, equal to 1 if the facility joined the SGP and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable for the
emissions equation compares average air emissions prior to the start of the SGP to just after the end of the program.9
ARTICLE IN PRESS
7 Facilities that have fewer than 10 full-time employees, manufacture less than 25,000 pounds or use less than 10,000 pounds of a listed chemical do
not have to report to the TRI. While the metal-finishing industry is mostly comprised of small establishments—50% have less than 10 employees according
to the US Census—there are more than 500 facilities that report to the TRI in a given year. Because chemicals are added and deleted from the TRI over
time, we only retain chemicals reported to the TRI over the entire study period.
8 Two observations were dropped due to extreme changes in emissions over time, which we believe are likely due to mistakes in paperwork or data
entry, or inconsistency in the estimation method used. Average emissions for non-participants are considerably lower without the two observations,
though the main regression results are unaffected.
9 We considered using total air plus surface water emissions. However, about 89% of facilities in our dataset report zero and 95% report 10 or fewer
pounds of surface water emissions in 1995. The correlation coefficient between total air and surface water emissions is 0.99.
K. Brouhle et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 57 (2009) 166–181 169
Specifically, CHANGE IN TRI EMISSIONS is defined at the facility level as the difference between the log of average total TRI
air emissions in 2002–2003 and the log of average total TRI air emissions in 1995–1996. In addition to total air emissions,
we also define the dependent variable in terms of point air emissions to examine the robustness of our results. We do not
rely on the difference between single-year emissions (e.g., 20031996) for the dependent variable because we want to
limit the impact of year-to-year fluctuations in emissions that may result from changes in estimation techniques and
reporting errors [12].
In Eq. (5) of the empirical model, the emissions regression includes SGP participation as an independent variable. We
include the predicted probability of joining SGP as an instrument for participation. Because many factors that affect a
facility’s net benefits from joining the SGP also affect emissions, the vectors X1it and X2it contain many of the same
explanatory variables. The predicted probability of joining the SGP helps to separate out the effects of these variables on
participation and emissions. The independent variables affecting participation and emissions fall into four categories:
program motivation, regulatory environment, community and environmental pressures, and firm and facility-specific
characteristics. Table 1 lists the variables and indicates in which equation they appear.
Facilities that are relatively clean may be more dedicated to environmental goals and therefore more likely to join the
program and to subsequently reduce emissions. On the other hand, relatively dirty facilities may join to improve their
reputation through association with an environmental program without necessarily changing behavior drastically. To
capture these possible effects, we include TOTAL TRI RELEASES, defined as the log of total air emissions in 1996, in both the
participation and emissions reductions equations.10 Participation in the SGP may also depend on the ease with which a
facility can meet program goals. Since the SGP allowed facilities to benchmark pollution to 1992 levels rather than to the
level of pollution at the time the facility joined the program, facilities that had already made reductions could join and,
with little change in behavior, point to progress toward SGP goals. We therefore create a variable PRIOR REDUCTIONS to
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 1
Summary of independent variables by equation
Category Variable Definition Participation
equation
Emissions
equation
Program
motivation
TOTAL TRI RELEASES Ln(1996 air emissions) O O
PRIOR REDUCTIONS Ln(1996 air emissions)Ln(1993 air emissions) O
Regulatory
environment
MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES 1995–1996 air emissions subject to the 1995
MP&M rule/1995–1996 total air emissions
O
CHANGE IN MP&M TO TOTAL
RELEASES
(2002–2003 MP&M emissions/2002–2003 total
emissions)(1995–1996 MP&M emissions/
1995–1996 total emissions)
O
PENALTY HISTORY Ln(proposed penalties, SEPs, and final assessed
monetary penalties) over 5 years prior to SGP
(1992–1996)
O
VIOLATION HISTORY Total number of violations over 5 years prior to
SGP (1992–1996)
O
TOTAL PENALTIES Ln(proposed penalties, SEPS, and final assessed
monetary penalties) in 1995–1996
O
TOTAL INSPECTIONS Total number of RCRA inspections in 1995–1996 O
NON-ATTAINMENT 1 if the county in which facility is located was in
non-attainment for SO2 in at least 1 year from
1992 to 1996
O
CHANGE IN NON-ATTAINMENT 1 if the county attainment status has changed
from 1996 to 2001
O
STATE REGULATIONS Levinson index O
STATE DUMMIES Dummy variables for states with more than 20
facilities (MI, IL, OH, CA)
O O
Community/
environmental
pressure
PERCENT MINORITY Percent minority within 3 mile radius O O
POPULATION DENSITY Ln(population density within 3 mile radius) O O
AFFLUENT 1 if the neighborhood is designated affluent O
ENV CONTRIBUTIONS Ln(1996 dues and contributions to environmental
groups in a state)
O
CHANGE IN ENV
CONTRIBUTIONS
Ln(2001 dues and contributions)Ln(1996 dues
and contributions)
O
Facility and firm-
specific
characteristics
NAMF 1 if a member of NAMF O O
OTHER VAS 1 if belongs to 33/50, Energy Star, or WasteWise O O
EMPLOYEE SIZE Ln(number of employees) O O
PUBLIC 1 if firm is public O O
10 When we use point air emissions for the dependent variable, we define these variables as point air emissions.
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measure the reductions in releases prior to the start of the program: the difference between the log of 1996 air emissions
and the log of 1993 air emissions.11 We include this variable only in the SGP participation equation.
Differences in regulatory environment may also affect decisions about whether to participate in the SGP and how much
to reduce emissions. The existing literature emphasizes the importance of regulatory pressure to encourage real
environmental actions [20,31,34,35]. The MP&M rule acted as a viable, potential regulation over this time period (see
Section 2). While the MP&M rule pertains to water effluent discharges, air emissions are often generated through the same
processes from the use of solvents, acids, and metals in surface preparation, plating, and finishing. To the extent that
facilities look for ways to reduce wastewater discharges through input substitution, pollution prevention, or metal recovery
processes, they also likely reduce air emissions. To capture the effect of potential regulation on the propensity of an
individual facility to join the SGP, we calculate MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES as the proportion of a facility’s 1996 TRI air
emissions subject to the 1995 proposed MP&M rule. This variable ranges from zero to one: the closer to one, the more
potentially vulnerable is a facility to regulation. For the emissions equation, we define CHANGE IN MP&M TO TOTAL
RELEASES as the difference between the proportion of total releases potentially subject to the 1995 and 2001 MP&M rules in
2002–2003 and the proportion of total releases subject to these rules in 1995–1996. Negative values indicate that a greater
proportion of emission changes occurred in chemicals under regulatory threat, reflecting a possible attempt to make the
facility less vulnerable to regulation over time.12
Facilities that have been out of compliance with environmental regulations may have an incentive to improve
environmental performance to reduce EPA scrutiny. We use several measures of non-compliance. For the participation
equation, we use the 5-year enforcement history prior to when a facility decided whether to join the SGP: PENALTY HISTORY
is the log of the total assessed penalties between 1992 and 1996, and VIOLATION HISTORY is the total number of violations
between 1992 and 1996.13 For the emissions equation, we use TOTAL PENALTIES, the log of all financial penalties imposed in
1995 and 1996, and TOTAL INSPECTIONS, the total number of RCRA inspections in 1995 and 1996, to represent regulatory
attention in the period immediately prior to the start of the program. We do not use changes in penalties or inspections
over time since they are likely endogeneous with changes in emissions.
We capture differences in regulatory environment across location through county attainment status with the National
Ambient Air Quality Standard for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and stringency of state regulations. Counties in non-attainment face
greater scrutiny and are required to implement specific plans and regulations to work toward future compliance. For the
participation equation, we use a dummy variable, NON-ATTAINMENT, to indicate whether a facility is located in a county out
of attainment with federally mandated levels for SO2 air emissions in years prior to the SGP (1992–1996). For the emissions
equation, we use CHANGE IN NON-ATTAINMENT, equal to 1 if a county’s attainment status changed between 1996 and
2002.14 An index from Levinson [28], STATE REGULATIONS, captures relative stringency of environmental regulations across
states. Since the index is only available at the beginning of our study period (1991–1993), it is only included in the
participation equation. We also define a set of dummy variables to capture other differences in states with a large
concentration of metal-finishing facilities (IL, CA, OH, and MI).
To capture potential differences in community pressure, we use PERCENT MINORITY and log of POPULATION DENSITY in a
three mile radius around the facility. We also include AFFLUENT, a dummy variable that indicates whether a facility is in an
affluent neighborhood. The environmental justice literature finds that hazardous waste facilities are located in poorer, more
diverse, and less dense communities [15]. In addition, Hamilton [16,17] shows that hazardous waste handlers consider the
potential for community-led political action in expansion decisions. Thus, we also measure the environmental pressure a
facility may face by using total environmental dues and contributions by state collected annually by the National Center for
Charitable Statistics of the Urban Institute. For the participation equation, we use ENV CONTRIBUTIONS, the log of 1996
environmental dues and contributions. For the emissions equation, we use the CHANGE IN ENV CONTRIBUTIONS, which is
the difference in the log of total dues and contributions in 2001 (the last year for which we have data) and 1996.
Firm and facility-specific characteristics may also influence a facility’s decision to join the SGP or its emissions behavior.
Since the SGP was launched with the support of the National Association of Metal Finishers (NAMF), we expect that trade
association members are more familiar with the program and hence more likely to join. Also, to the extent that poor
environmental performance by a subset of facilities casts a negative image on the industry as a whole, NAMF may have an
interest in promoting the SGP [26]. We identify whether the firm belongs to the trade association with the dummy variable
NAMF. We also identify firms that belong to 33/50, Energy Star, or WasteWise voluntary programs with the dummy variable
OTHER VAS. Participation in one voluntary program may lead to participation in others [2,38] and may predispose a facility
toward greater emission reductions.
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11 We did not define this as the difference in 1992 and 1996 emissions because we want to balance missing observations in the early years with the
ability to capture past emission reductions that count as progress in the SGP. For facilities with missing emissions data in 1993, we explore two options:
assume that emissions are zero or drop the observations.
12 We explored an alternate definition to capture the threat of regulation in the emissions equation, the difference in logs of average emissions under
threat from MP&M in 1995–1996 and 2002–2003. We found our results are robust to this alternate definition.
13 RCRIS also has total number of inspections and enforcement actions, which are highly correlated with total violations. The literature is unclear
about which of these might be a better measure of past enforcement behavior.
14 No county that was in attainment in 1992 went out of attainment in later years. A noticeable number of counties have gone from non-attainment to
attainment. In 1996, 29 facilities were in counties out-of-attainment for SO2. In 2003, 20 were in non-attainment counties.
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Compositionally, these facilities are somewhat similar in what they produce (they are all from SIC 3471). However,
facility-specific information such as size, production level, and technology may be important in predicting environmental
behavior. For instance, larger facilities may be more visible and hence under more pressure from consumers, shareholders,
and regulators [2,40], or they may be more environmentally responsive if economies of scale exist in implementing
environmental protection activities [6]. Unfortunately, since most firms in the metal-finishing industry are private, detailed
financial data are not available. From InfoUSA, we include the log of the number of employees at the facility, EMPLOYEE SIZE,
and a dummy variable, PUBLIC, to indicate whether a facility is publicly or privately held.
4.2. Summary statistics
According to the US Census of Manufacturers, there were 3401 establishments in the metal-finishing industry (SIC code
3471) in 1997, 97% of which were single-facility firms. In 1996, 771 facilities from the metal-finishing industry submitted
full reports to the TRI. Our sample consists of 199 metal-finishing facilities. These facilities reported to the TRI in all study
years and were present in other datasets utilized for the study. The facilities in our sample are located in 40 of 48 states.
Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and California account for almost half of the facilities. Data from the US Census of Manufacturers
confirm that this distribution is broadly representative of the industry (42% of the industry is located in one of these four
states).
Summary statistics in Table 2 indicate that total air emissions for metal finishers reporting to TRI have declined by 49%
over the study period to an average of 3924 pounds per facility in 2003. SGP participants experienced a moderate 7%
decline in emissions over the same time period. While SGP facilities achieved smaller reductions, participants emitted
substantially less air pollution than non-participants on average in each year of the study period. As expected, the
difference in average emissions between participants and non-participants decreased over time, given the more rapid
decline in non-participant emissions. There also appears to be less variance in SGP participant emissions. This is confirmed
when we calculate the coefficient of variation for SGP and non-SGP facilities (see Table 2).
We investigate the wide disparity between participants and non-participants in the earlier years by looking at 1996
average total air emissions by quintile (see Table 3). Not surprisingly, large emitters dominate the average and thus the
overall difference in emissions between participants and non-participants: Non-participants in the last quintile emit about
twice as much, on average, as participants. What is not apparent from Table 2 is that this relationship does not characterize
the remaining quintiles. The first three quintiles, the relatively clean facilities, look quite similar across participants and
non-participants. For the fourth quintile, participants actually emit almost twice as much as non-participants.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the independent variables in the participation and emissions equations. SGP
participants tend to have a higher proportion of MP&M releases. While both participants and non-participants tend to
decrease their share of MP&M releases, participants decrease this proportionally more than non-participants. SGP
participants also tend to have lower penalties but almost the same number of violations as non-participants. They also tend
to increase emissions prior to the SGP, while non-participants tend to decrease emissions. Finally, SGP participants tend to
have fewer employees; be members of NAMF; belong to other voluntary agreements; and be located in states where
environmental groups receive greater dues and contributions, counties that are in non-attainment prior to SGP, and
affluent neighborhoods.
5. Results
We present results from several sets of regressions that are designed to address the three questions identified above.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 2
Average total air emissions in SIC 3471
Year Total sample (199 facilities) SGP participants (65 facilities) Non-participants (134 facilities)
Mean Standard
deviation
Coefficient of
variation
Mean Standard
deviation
Coefficient of
variation
Mean Standard
deviation
Coefficient of
variation
1995 7719 43,192 5.60 3464 7782 2.25 9805 52,294 5.33
1996 6848 26,635 3.89 4595 10,827 2.36 7964 31,556 3.96
2002 4787 19,445 4.06 3472 7816 2.25 5446 23,068 4.24
2003 3924 12,914 3.29 3214 7108 2.21 4290 14,951 3.49
Coefficient of variation ¼ standard deviation/mean.
Figures are in pounds of releases.
Source: Toxic Release Inventory.
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5.1. What factors affected a facility’s decision to participate in the SGP?
To identify factors that affected a facility’s decision to participate in the SGP, we run a series of probit regressions where
the dependent variable, SGP, equals 1 if a facility participated in the SGP and 0 otherwise. There are two basic differences
between the four sets of coefficient estimates presented in Table 5. First, we use point source air emissions to define TOTAL
TRI RELEASES, MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES, and PRIOR REDUCTIONS in columns (1) and (2), while we use total air emissions
for these variables in columns (3) and (4). Second, we use all 199 observations in columns (1) and (3), while we rely on 166
observations based on facilities that reported to TRI in 1993 (See footnote 11) in columns (2) and (4). Corrections for
heteroskedasticity are made using White’s estimator of variance.
The results are quite robust across the four specifications for most variables. Generally, the signs of significant
coefficients do not change. However, the significance of three variables, NON-ATTAINMENT, MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES, and
a state dummy (CA), vary with sample size: NON-ATTAINMENT and the state dummy are significant only for the full sample,
while MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES is significant only for the restricted sample. We find that the model correctly predicts the
participation decision 75% to 78% of the time.
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Table 3
Average total air emissions in SIC 3471 by quintile for 1996
Quintile SGP participants (65 facilities) Non-participants (134 facilities)
1 5 4
2 102 118
3 495 484
4 2287 1391
5 19,859 38,969
Note that a participant quintile consists of 13 observations while a non-participant quintile consists of approximately 27 observations.
Table 4
Summary statistics
Continuous variables Total sample (199
facilities)
SGP participants (65
facilities)
Non-participants (134
facilities)
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
Mean Standard
deviation
TRI emissions in 1996 (pounds)a,b 6848 26,635 4595 10,827 7964 31,556
Change in TRI emissions from 1993 to 1996 (pounds)a,b 978 30,688 2497 9049 2664 36,794
MP&M emissions in 1995–1996 divided by total emissions
in 1995–1996b
0.39 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.38 0.46
Change in MP&M emissions to total emissions from
1995–1996 to 2002–2003b
0.03 0.32 0.05 0.34 0.01 0.31
Number of penalties from 1992 to 1996a $2045 $12,838 $946 $6857 $2577 $14,895
Number of violations from 1992 to 1996 2.19 3.70 2.17 3.73 2.19 3.70
Levinson index 0.94 0.18 0.94 0.18 0.94 0.18
Percent minority within a 3 mile radius 0.37 0.26 0.35 0.25 0.37 0.26
Population density within a 3 mile radiusa 4709 4781 4718 3487 4705 5308
Total environmental group contributions in 1996 (millions)a $46.0 $60.8 $59.8 $71.4 $39.4 $53.9
Change in environmental group contributions, 1996–2001
(millions)a
$5.5 $24.2 $6.9 $3.1 $4.8 $20.0
Number of employeesa 91 101 86 65 93 114
Dummy variables Total sample (199
facilities) (%)
SGP participants (65
facilities) (%)
Non-participants (134
facilities) (%)
Facilities in non-attainment counties 14 18 12
Facilities in counties that changed attainment status between
1996 and 2001
4 5 3
Facilities in affluent neighborhood 18 22 16
Members of NAMF 50 80 35
Participate in other voluntary programs 9 12 7
Publicly traded firms 5 2 6
a Reported in natural units (e.g. pounds, dollars) not the units used in the regressions (e.g. logs).
b Reported using total emissions. A similar relationship between groups is found for point emissions.
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Variables included to account for emissions-related reasons to join the program do not have significant predictive
power. PRIOR REDUCTIONS, included to proxy for the ease with which a facility can meet program goals, and TOTAL TRI
RELEASES in 1996, included to allow for the possibility that cleaner or more environmentally responsible facilities may be
more likely to join, are not significant.
We find that several types of regulatory pressure are relevant to the SGP participation decision. This is consistent with
the finding in the existing literature that regulatory pressure encourages real environmental action [9,20,32,34,35].
Facilities located in states with more stringent environmental regulations are more likely to join the SGP in all four
specifications. The regulatory threat variable, MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES, is positive and significant for the restricted
sample specifications. This result lends some support to anecdotal evidence that the MP&M rule played an important role
in the SGP, with the proportion of a facility’s emissions stemming from chemicals potentially subject to the MP&M rule
positively affecting the likelihood of joining the SGP. Facilities that are located in a county out of attainment with federal air
regulations also are more likely to join the SGP, but this result is only significant in the full sample. Finally, larger penalties
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Table 5
Coefficient estimates for the SGP participation equation
Variables Point air Total air
Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TOTAL TRI RELEASES 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
PRIOR REDUCTIONS 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES 0.47 0.66** 0.36 0.58*
(0.29) (0.32) (0.26) (0.31)
PENALTY HISTORY 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
VIOLATION HISTORY 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
NON-ATTAINMENT 0.75* 0.66 0.70* 0.59
(0.39) (0.41) (0.37) (0.39)
STATE REGULATIONS 1.01* 1.38** 1.04* 1.39**
(0.58) (0.67) (0.57) (0.63)
PERCENT MINORITY 1.28** 1.62** 1.45** 1.87**
(0.63) (0.70) (0.66) (0.71)
POPULATION DENSITY 0.29** 0.42*** 0.28** 0.40***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
AFFLUENT 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.14
(0.30) (0.37) (0.30) (0.34)
ENV CONTRIBUTIONS 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.79*** 0.81***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
NAMF 1.26*** 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.14***
(0.25) (0.29) (0.26) (0.30)
OTHER VAS 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.39
(0.35) (0.41) (0.35) (0.42)
EMPLOYEE SIZE 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.04
(0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17)
PUBLIC 0.34 0.24 0.25 0.12
(0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.46)
IL 0.66* 0.75* 0.64* 0.740*
(0.35) (0.40) (0.34) (0.40)
CA 1.40** 0.82 1.58** 0.99
(0.62) (0.71) (0.62) (0.70)
MI 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.10
(0.36) (0.41) (0.37) (0.42)
OH 0.55 0.63 0.46 0.49
(0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.40)
Constant 17.09*** 17.87*** 17.97*** 19.16***
(3.61) (3.82) (3.57) (4.00)
Log likelihood 90.44 72.80 90.62 73.15
Percent correctly predicted 75 78 76 78
Pseudo-R2 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.30
Observations 199 166 199 166
Dependent variable: Participation in SGP; equals 1 if facility participates in SGP, equal to 0 otherwise.
The number of stars indicates the level of significance of a coefficient: *indicates it is significant at 10%; **indicates it is significant at 5%; and ***indicates
it is significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses.
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or a greater number of violations do not appear to affect a facility’s SGP decision. This may be because facilities do not view
voluntary programs as having an impact on the amount of regulatory scrutiny they face from the EPA.
Two of the variables included to measure community pressure, PERCENT MINORITY and POPULATION DENSITY, are
significant. A higher share of minorities in the neighborhood reduces the likelihood that the facility joins the SGP. Facilities
in denser neighborhoods are more likely to join the SGP. To the extent that these variables proxy for the degree of
community pressure the facility faces, they adhere to hypotheses in the literature [17]. A facility that wants to minimize
potential compensation to the community for environmental damages is more likely to join a voluntary program in areas
where there are higher levels of collective action and more people to potentially compensate. The variable AFFLUENT is not
significant, but as a dummy variable this variable may not suitably capture differences in income levels. ENV
CONTRIBUTIONS is positive and significant. The more dues and contributions received by state environmental groups,
the more likely a facility in that state joins the SGP. The California and Illinois dummies are generally negative and
significant: a facility located in a state with a large number of metal-finishing facilities is less likely to join the SGP. This
may indicate that there are few spillovers across facilities within a state with regard to the voluntary program.
Of the firm and facility characteristics included in the regressions, only NAMF is significant. Facilities that belong to the
trade association are more likely to join the SGP. This finding adheres to expectations, since NAMF was actively involved in
the creation of the voluntary program, advertised the SGP widely to its members, and encouraged them to join.15
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of a change in each of the significant variables upon the probability of joining the
SGP. For the purpose of discussion, we refer to the marginal effects for point air emissions, listed in column 1. The largest
marginal effect is associated with NAMF members: they are 38% more likely to join the SGP. Several other dummy variables
also have large effects: facilities located in non-attainment counties are 27% more likely to join the SGP, and those in
California and Illinois are 26% and 18% less likely to join the SGP, respectively. Of the continuous variables, STATE
REGULATIONS, PERCENT MINORITY, and ENV CONTRIBUTIONS have the largest effects. For instance, a 1% increase in a state’s
Levinson index increases the probability of facilities in that state joining by 0.31% while an increase of 1% in the proportion
of minorities surrounding a facility decreases the likelihood of joining the SGP by 0.40%.
5.2. Did the SGP and MP&M regulatory threat affect facility air emissions?
We next examine the results for the emissions change regression, presented in Table 7. The dependent variable is the
difference in logs of average air emissions from 2002–2003 to 1995–1996. Care should be taken in interpreting the
coefficient estimates: if a facility increases emissions over time, then the dependent variable is positive; if a facility reduces
emissions over time then the dependent variable is negative. We use point source air emissions to define the dependent
variable as well as CHANGE IN MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES and TOTAL TRI RELEASES in columns (1) and (2). We use total air
emissions to define these variables in columns (3) and (4). All 199 observations are used in columns (1) and (3), while we
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Table 6
Marginal effects for variables significantly affecting SGP participation
Variables Point air Total air
Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES 0.14 0.20** 0.11 0.17*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
NON-ATTAINMENT 0.27* 0.23 0.24* 0.20
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
STATE REGULATIONS 0.31* 0.42** 0.32* 0.41**
(0.18) (0.20) (0.18) 0.19
PERCENT MINORITY 0.40** 0.49** 0.45** 0.56**
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
POPULATION DENSITY 0.09** 0.13*** 0.09** 0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ENV CONTRIBUTIONS 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
NAMF 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.33***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
IL 0.18* 0.19* 0.17* 0.17*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
CA 0.26** 0.18 0.26** 0.20
(0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08)
15 In an alternate specification, we also examine the possibility that larger facilities are more like to participate in the SGP when located in a state with
higher environmental contributions. When this interaction variable is included, EMPLOYEE SIZE is significant. However, ENV CONTRIBUTIONS is no longer
significant, the interaction term is not significant, and the marginal effects and pseudo-R squared are unaffected.
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restrict the sample to 166 observations based on facilities that reported to TRI in 1993 (see footnote 11) in columns (2) and
(4). We correct for heteroskedasticity in all specifications using White’s estimator of variance.
Before discussing the results, recall that we include the predicted probability of joining the SGP as an independent
variable in the regression. Previous literature [19,23,40] takes a similar approach under the assumption that facilities that
are most likely to join may also be most likely to reduce emissions. If this is the case, including SGP participation directly in
the emissions regression would bias the results. A common solution has been to regress the participation decision on a set
of independent variables and then use the predicted probability of participation as an instrument in the emission equation,
rather than to explicitly test for the existence of such bias in the participation decision. Employing such a test here, we
reject the null hypothesis that OLS yields consistent estimates for three of the four specifications.16 This result suggests that
the use of the predicted probability of joining the SGP probably is warranted when evaluating facility emissions behavior.
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Table 7
Coefficient estimates for the change in emissions equation
Variables Point air Total air
Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of joining SGP 1.54 1.31 1.34 0.59
(0.99) (0.85) (0.90) (0.86)
TOTAL TRI RELEASES 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.30*** 0.27***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
CHANGE IN MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES 3.19*** 3.43*** 3.12*** 3.37***
(0.45) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
TOTAL PENALTIES 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
TOTAL INSPECTIONS 0.16 0.24* 0.26* 0.31**
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
CHANGE IN NON-ATTAINMENT 1.42* 1.76** 0.72 0.65
(0.73) (0.88) (1.10) (1.36)
PERCENT MINORITY 0.05 0.12 0.22 0.50
(0.82) (0.76) (0.84) (0.74)
POPULATION DENSITY 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.12
(0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13)
CHANGE IN ENV CONTRIBUTIONS 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.24
(0.39) (0.44) (0.42) (0.50)
NAMF 0.95* 0.89** 0.79* 0.62
(0.52) (0.44) (0.45) (0.40)
OTHER VAs 0.25 0.49 0.16 0.26
(0.40) (0.32) (0.44) (0.30)
EMPLOYEE SIZE 0.44** 0.35** 0.36** 0.28*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16)
PUBLIC 1.46* 1.38* 0.68 0.65
(0.77) (0.76) (0.54) (0.51)
IL 0.70 0.86 0.64 0.38
(0.60) (0.57) (0.60) (0.59)
CA 1.14* 1.17 1.96*** 1.44
(0.63) (0.89) (0.74) (1.01)
MI 0.11 0.21 0.46 0.24
(0.44) (0.53) (0.43) (0.48)
OH 0.61 0.80* 0.75 0.35
(0.50) (0.42) (0.50) (0.42)
Constant 0.25 0.42 1.02 1.24
(1.54) (1.21) (1.54) (1.19)
R-squared 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.43
Observations 199 166 199 166
Dependent variable: log average air emissions in 2002–2003 minus log average air emissions in 1995–1996.
Note that *indicates a coefficient is significant at 10%; **indicates it is significant at 5%; and ***indicates it is significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are
listed in parentheses.
16 Our test for endogeneity is complicated because participation is modeled using a probit. The standard approach is to use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test: the variable suspected to be endogeneous is regressed on a set of instruments, and then the residuals from this regression and the suspected variable
are included in the subsequent regression. If the coefficient on the residuals significantly differs from zero, then the suspected variable is endogenous and
the instrumental variable approach is warranted. However, this test is commonly conducted when the variable in question is linearly modeled. If we
employ OLS for our participation decision and test for endogenity, we reject the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient in three of four cases. If we use a
probit for the participation decision, the interpretation of errors is more difficult. Davidson and MacKinnon [7] show that including the predicted variables
from a modeled instrument rather than the residuals and testing for significance produces an equivalent result. Using the predicted values of our probit to
test for endogeneity, we reject the null hypothesis for point source emissions (and thus, suspect endogenity), but fail to reject it for total air emissions.
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We begin by discussing whether the probability of joining the SGP had an effect on the change in average emissions
prior to the program in 1995–1996, relative to just after its completion in 2002–2003. The coefficient on the probability of
joining the SGP is negative in all four cases: facilities with a high probability of joining the SGP reduce emissions by more
than facilities with a low probability of joining. While this result appears to support the effectiveness of the SGP, it is not
significant for any specification. Alternate specifications of the model show that this conclusion is relatively robust for the
overall study period. This result lends itself to the hypothesis in the literature that facilities often may join voluntary
programs with good intentions but make few real changes in behavior as a direct result of joining the program. We know
from the summary statistics that SGP facilities, on average, emit less initially than non-SGP facilities. This may mean that
while relatively clean facilities derived some benefit from joining the SGP, there was not sufficient incentive for these
facilities to further reduce emissions.
The regulatory threat variable, CHANGE IN MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES, is consistently significant and positively related to
emission changes for all specifications. This implies that the proposed MP&M regulation had a discernible effect on
behavior: facilities that reduced emissions of MP&M chemicals relative to total releases made more progress in reducing
overall air emissions over this time period. Coupled with the insignificant result on the predicted probability of joining the
SGP, this result provides evidence that the voluntary program alone did not effectively replace the traditional policy tool,
the threat of which appears to be a large motivating factor for reducing emissions. In a set of regressions not presented
here, we included an interaction term between the predicted probability of joining SGP and the MP&M variable.17 It was not
significant in any specification. Thus, the two variables can be interpreted as measuring the separate effect of each policy
variable on emissions. However, it is worth noting that our regulatory threat variable only captures an individual facility’s
potential vulnerability to the cost of future regulation. Overall industry performance, relevant for affecting the likelihood of
regulation and its relative stringency, is not captured by this variable.
Only one other variable associated with regulatory pressure is significant across most specifications: TOTAL
INSPECTIONS. The number of inspections a facility faced in 1995 and 1996 is negatively correlated with emission changes.
This result is intuitive: facilities that historically have been inspected more frequently by the EPA reduce emissions by more
than facilities that face less oversight. Change in NON-ATTAINMENT status also has a negative coefficient, but it is significant
only for point source air emissions. This variable indicates that facilities in counties that went into attainment reduced
point air emissions more than facilities in counties where attainment status remained unchanged.
The variable TOTAL TRI RELEASES is negatively correlated with emission changes over the study period for all
specifications. In other words, the dirtier the facility in 1996, the more progress it made in reducing emissions over the next
7 years. This result makes sense if we consider that dirtier facilities may be able to invest relatively little initially to make
large reductions in emissions; cleaner facilities may have already found the ‘‘low-hanging fruit,’’ the simplest and least
costly reductions and therefore incur higher costs to reduce emissions further.
Variables included in the regressions to capture community or environmental pressure, PERCENT MINORITY,
POPULATION DENSITY, and CHANGE IN ENV CONTRIBUTIONS, are not significant. While these variables may influence a
facility’s decision of whether to join the SGP, they do not appear to influence decisions of how much to reduce emissions.
Of the firm and facility characteristics included, EMPLOYEE SIZE is positive and significant for all specifications: larger
facilities reduce emissions less than smaller facilities.18 Membership in the industry trade association, NAMF, which had a
strong influence on a facility’s decision to join the SGP, is significant for three of four specifications. However, it is also
positive, meaning that NAMF members made fewer reductions than non-members. In an alternate specification not
presented here, we examine the possibility that facilities belonging to both NAMF and the SGP respond differently than
NAMF members that did not join the SGP. That variable was never significant nor did it affect the sign or significance of
NAMF. Finally, if a facility is PUBLIC, we find that it reduced emissions more than privately held facilities. This result holds
true for all specifications but is significant only for point air emissions.
5.3. Did the SGP and regulatory threat have a different effect on emissions over time?
As previously noted, the nature of the regulatory threat faced by metal finishers varied over time. The MP&M regulation
was first proposed in 1995 and was re-proposed in 2001 with more stringent limits. Thus, we have reason to expect that
facilities reduced emissions in response to the initial regulatory threat as well as to an increase in its relative stringency.
There are also several reasons to expect the effect of the SGP on emissions varied over time. Lyon and Maxwell [30]
suggest that a voluntary program may have a differential impact on emissions over time because it increases the diffusion
of cost-effective abatement techniques. This hypothesis suggests that SGP participants may initially reduce emissions by
more than non-participants due to information gained via the voluntary program. However as information diffuses non-
participants also utilize these techniques, which would then reduce the discrepancy in emission changes across the two
groups. An alternative hypothesis to that proposed by Lyon and Maxwell suggests an explicit interaction between the two
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17 We also interact the variables CHANGE IN ENV CONTRIBUTIONS and EMPLOYEE SIZE. The interaction term is not significant for any of the
specifications.
18 More relevant than employee size at a given point in time is the change in the number of employees or sales over time. However, we do not have
access to such data. Since we are unable to control for production changes, we are implicitly assuming that changes in output, if any, are independent of
SGP participation.
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policy levers—that participants may use the SGP as a signal to regulators of environmental responsibility to reduce the
likelihood of future or stricter regulations [9,29,32,35]. How strongly this signal is conveyed to regulators may depend on
the immediacy and severity of the threat faced by the industry as well as how costly it may be to the individual facility and/
or firm. When the threat of regulation is low, participation by some sub-group of the industry in the voluntary program
may be sufficient as a signal. As the threat of regulation grows, however, the industry may face increased pressure to show
regulators that the voluntary program provides real emissions reductions and that the proposed regulation is therefore
unnecessary. With a strong regulatory threat, individual facilities also have an incentive to reduce emissions to lower their
vulnerability to (and costs from) future regulation. This hypothesis suggests that, in spite of incentives for some firms to
free-ride, participants will reduce emissions more when the regulatory threat is more severe.
We split the sample into two time periods to examine whether the impact of the MP&M regulatory threat and the SGP
vary across time: We use average emissions from 1999 to 2000 as the halfway point. The initial time period includes only
the first few years of the program and is characterized by a lower threat of regulation and possibly limited information
diffusion to non-participants of the SGP. The subsequent time period includes emission changes at the end of the SGP
(relative to the early years of the program) and is characterized by a higher threat of regulation and possibly broader
information dissemination to non-participants. The results for the emissions change regression over the two time periods
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Table 8
Coefficient estimates for the change in emissions equation by time period
Variables Entire time period 1995/1996–2002/
2003
Early time period 1995/1996–1999/
2000
Late time period 1999/2000–2002/
2003
Total air Point air Total air Point air Total air Point air
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability of joining SGP 1.34 1.54 1.93** 0.92 2.97*** 1.70*
(0.90) (0.99) (0.87) (0.93) (0.83) (0.99)
TOTAL TRI RELEASES 0.30*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.16***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
CHANGE IN MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES 3.12*** 3.19*** 4.11*** 4.02*** 2.01*** 2.53***
(0.50) (0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.64) (0.49)
TOTAL PENALTIES 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06* 0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
TOTAL INSPECTIONS 0.26* 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.20** 0.11*
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06)
CHANGE IN NON-ATTAINMENT 0.72 1.42* 1.30** 1.02* 1.49** 1.22
(1.10) (0.73) (0.51) (0.57) (0.72) (0.81)
PERCENT MINORITY 0.22 0.05 1.21 1.32* 0.94 0.92
(0.84) (0.82) (0.83) (0.72) (0.60) (0.67)
POPULATION DENSITY 0.07 0.09 0.20 0.24 0.15 0.06
(0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.11)
CHANGE IN ENV CONTRIBUTIONS 0.09 0.10 0.34 0.57 0.37 0.24
(0.42) (0.39) (0.62) (0.51) (0.31) (0.32)
NAMF 0.79* 0.95* 0.67 0.38 1.46*** 1.02*
(0.45) (0.52) (0.45) (0.48) (0.45) (0.53)
OTHER VAS 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.26
(0.44) (0.40) (0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.32)
EMPLOYEE SIZE 0.36** 0.44** 0.08 0.28 0.48*** 0.45**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
PUBLIC 0.68 1.46* 0.96 1.37 0.09 0.06
(0.54) (0.77) (0.78) (0.83) (0.63) (0.70)
IL 0.64 0.70 0.33 0.13 0.53 0.17
(0.60) (0.60) (0.39) (0.46) (0.40) (0.51)
CA 1.96*** 1.14* 2.07*** 1.16** 0.46 0.17
(0.74) (0.63) (0.74) (0.59) (0.63) (0.40)
MI 0.46 0.11 0.48 0.15 0.35 0.43
(0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41) (0.34) (0.31)
OH 0.75 0.61 0.76** 0.71* 1.66*** 1.42**
(0.50) (0.50) (0.38) (0.41) (0.56) (0.62)
Constant 1.02 0.25 1.49 0.16 0.86 1.03
(1.54) (1.54) (1.45) (1.42) (1.03) (1.01)
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.32 0.27
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199
Note that CHANGE IN TOTAL TO MP&M RELEASES, CHANGE IN NON-ATTAINMENT, and CHANGE IN ENV CONTRIBUTIONS have been adjusted to the relevant
time period, though we only have data through 2002 on non-attainment status and through 2001 for state environmental contributions. For levels of
TOTAL TRI RELEASES, TOTAL INSPECTIONS, and TOTAL PENALTIES, we have redefined them in the later time period as follows: TOTAL TRI RELEASES uses 1999
data; TOTAL INSPECTIONS and TOTAL PENALTIES use 1999 and 2000 data.
Note that *indicates a coefficient is significant at 10%; **indicates it is significant at 5%; and ***indicates it is significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are
listed in parentheses.
K. Brouhle et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 57 (2009) 166–181178
are presented in Table 8. We present only the results for the full sample here.19 Independent variables that change over
time have been adjusted to reflect the appropriate time period (see Table 8).
Unlike results for the entire study period, the effect of the predicted probability of joining the SGP on emission changes
is consistently significant in the later time period and significant in one of two specifications for the earlier time period.
These results suggest that the SGP had an effect on participant behavior and that it varied across time periods. SGP
participants initially reduce emissions by less than non-participants relative to pre-program emissions. However, in the
later time period, SGP participants reduce emissions by more than non-participants.
The facility-specific measure of the regulatory threat, CHANGE IN MP&M TO TOTAL RELEASES, continues to be
consistently significant and positively related to emission changes. This means that facilities (i.e., participants and non-
participants) react to the initial regulatory threat by reducing emissions and then react again to an increase in its relative
stringency by reducing emissions further.20 Based on this evidence, it is possible to make the case that the threat of
regulation induced metal finishers, regardless of participation in the SGP, to decrease emissions in an attempt to reduce
their vulnerability to future regulation. Evidence also indicates that CHANGE IN NON-ATTAINMENT is related to emission
reductions for both the early and later time periods. However, a number of variables that are significant in the original
regressions for the entire study period only appear to be relevant in the later time period (i.e., TOTAL INSPECTIONS,
EMPLOYEE SIZE, and NAMF). This may be due in part to the limited ability to change emissions in the short term. Signs are
consistent with those for the entire study period.
An initial examination of these results seems to indicate little support for the hypothesis that initial access to better
information through the SGP results in greater reductions by participants in the first few years, but that differences
between participants and non-participants dissipate over time as information spreads. There is a possible explanation for
the observed behavior, however, that may still be consistent with information dissemination over time. Recall that SGP
participants tend to be relatively cleaner facilities. It is possible that SGP participants were already well informed with
regard to possible abatement opportunities and—in fact—made use of those opportunities prior to joining the program, so
that the SGP did not have a large effect on behavior initially. Over time, these facilities may have benefited from access to
new information via the SGP (and increased flexibility) that allowed them to take advantage of additional abatement
opportunities. It is still possible that such information is then subsequently disseminated to non-participants.
The finding of a differential impact of the predicted probability of joining the SGP on emission behavior over time seems
broadly consistent with the hypothesis that participants changed emissions due to a change in the regulatory threat faced
by the industry as a whole. While free-riding may complicate the ability of the industry to clearly communicate a strong
signal to regulators via the voluntary program, the regulatory threat does contribute significantly to explaining why a sub-
group of the metal-finishing industry joined the SGP. We also find that these participants reduced emissions differentially
relative to non-participants over the two time periods. This points to the possibility that, as a group, participants may have
attempted to use the SGP as a way to forestall future regulation.
It is worth noting, however, that the impact of a participants’ individual vulnerability to future regulation (measured by
the MP&M variable) on emissions appears to be independent from the predicted probability of joining the SGP. When an
interaction term is included in the regressions (not presented here), it is not significant for any specification. Thus, the
coefficient on the SGP variable only measures the effect of joining the program, absent the effect of the regulatory threat on
an individual facility’s vulnerability to potential regulation (and vice versa).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the impact of two policy levers, a voluntary program and the threat of regulation, on the
emissions behavior of facilities in the metal-finishing industry. We first use a probit model to examine factors that
contribute to a facility’s decision of whether to participate in the SGP. Finding evidence of endogeneity, we use the results
of the probit equation to calculate the predicted probability of joining the SGP and include this variable on the right-hand
side of the emissions reductions equation, along with measures of the regulatory threat and other relevant measures of
external pressure. Factors related to several forms of external pressure such as community characteristics, state
environmental contributions, and membership in the professional organization, NAMF, appear to affect a facility’s decision
to participate in the SGP. We find some evidence that the proportion of emissions potentially subject to the proposed
MP&M regulation is related to a facility’s participation decision.
The emissions regression demonstrates a number of intriguing results. First, we do not find robust evidence that the SGP
had a significant impact on emission reductions over the entire study period. This result lends itself to the hypothesis in the
literature that facilities often join voluntary programs, perhaps with good intentions, but make no real changes in behavior
as a direct result of joining the program However, running regressions for two separate time periods tells a more nuanced
story. While participants do not appear to initially make use of the program to reduce emissions, they do so in the later
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19 Results for the restricted sample are largely consistent with these full sample results. Any results discussed but not reported in the paper are
available from the authors upon request.
20 We compare the emission reductions that are implied by a small, given change in the proportion of MP&M to total releases, evaluated at the mean
for all other variables. This exercise demonstrates that facilities reduce emissions by more in response to the initial regulatory threat than they do in
reaction to the incremental increase in its stringency (relative to the level of stringency in the first time period).
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years of the program. This finding may be consistent with the idea that relatively clean facilities do not initially change
emissions because they have already made use of available abatement opportunities, but with time and increased
flexibility (and possibly new information via the SGP) they are able to make further reductions in the later time period.
The regulatory threat faced by the metal-finishing industry is consistently significant across all emission reduction
specifications. One may make the case that the threat of regulation induced metal finishers, regardless of SGP participation,
to reduce emissions in an attempt to either avoid or prepare for regulation. The split sample results indicate that facilities
reacted strongly to both the initial threat of regulation and to an increase in its relative stringency. The fact that a sub-
group of the metal-finishing industry joined the SGP in reaction to the regulatory threat and then reduced emissions
differentially over time relative to non-participants also points to the possibility that this was related to overarching
industry concerns about future regulation.
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